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High rates of growth have characterized developments in the Indian economy over the last few years, with a growth rate of close to 9 per cent for three consecutive years from 2005-6 to 2007-8, surpassing all expectations (Government of India 2007). Whereas GDP growth amounted to less than 4 per cent per year during 1965-74 (in fact since Indian independence in 1947), it has been close to 6 per cent per year since 1985, an increase in the growth rate by one-and-a-half times. Even more significant is the increase in the annual rate of GDP per capita growth from 1.4 per cent during 1965-74 to 4.3 per cent during 1995-2004, a threefold increase, resulting partly from a slowing down of population growth (Rao et al. 2008). 

This remarkable growth, often claimed as evidence for the success of a pro-market strategy that has led to an expansion of choices and opportunities, is viewed as a key characteristic of the 'new India'. Yet concerns about the inclusiveness of the growth process remain, pointing to the persistence of an 'old India', with not all sectors, states or sections of the population able to equally access these new, market-based opportunities. The interests of urban, private capital (big business) and rural social elites (often newly emergent caste-based groups) continue to be met at the cost of providing education, health or extension services to the poor, confronted with both rising prices and exclusion from the new regime of accumulation (Corbridge and Harriss 2000; Kohli 2006; Bardhan 1998). Jenkins (1999) further points out that rather than disappearing, new forms of patronage have emerged, with political networks being used to compensate powerful allies, as this was perhaps the only way the reforms could be pushed forward little-by-little and sustained. 

Recent analyses of growth in India reveal that in terms of its sectoral composition, while agriculture's contribution has remained stable at around 18-21 per cent during the last decade (though declining to less than 10 per cent in the last few years), industry's contribution has hovered around 25 per cent, with services increasing to over 50 per cent (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2007). A disaggregated analysis suggests that it is mainly finance, insurance, real estate and business services that have contributed to this growth. Deeper analysis of this data, however, indicates that the faster a sector grows, the lower the participation of women in that sector (women make up about 35 per cent of the workforce in agriculture, 25 per cent in industry, and less than 20 per cent in services); participation of the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) is also lower (Rao et al. 2008). 

Headcount poverty has continued to decline in the last two decades,​[2]​ yet the sectoral shifts in growth have led to the steady rise in inequalities, giving rise in fact to new forms and manifestations of inequality, both material and non-material. Reports of continuing farmer suicides from different parts of the country have raised questions about the neglect of the rural sector, still home to over 60 per cent of the Indian population, and its exclusion from growth. A rapid decline in sex ratios in the prosperous parts of the country, revealing an overall improved quality of life over the last two decades, similarly indicates that with rising household incomes and access to technologies such as those for pre-natal sex determination, son preference and female disadvantage are intensifying. This is seen in women's poorer survival chances, their declining mobility, and increased violence against women. 

In India, while being disadvantaged is multi-faceted, caste and gender are recognized as two key indicators of social stratification. Women and members of lower-caste groups experience a range of inequalities: in health and nutrition, education, wages, occupation and ownership and control and access to assets and resources; but perhaps women of low-caste groups are multiply disadvantaged. Low entitlements, social barriers and discrimination alongside changing familial relationships​[3]​ combine to dampen their capabilities and hinder market possibilities.  As a result, the low castes, and in particular the women amongst them, suffer disproportionate rates of poverty -- a situation that is passed on from generation to generation despite gender- and caste-based affirmative action by formal institutions (Mehta and Shah 2006), as enshrined in the constitution of India. 

The Approach Paper to the 11th Plan highlights this concern, drawing attention to both the rural-urban divide and the gender divide as critical barriers to growth (Government of India 2006, 3). This has led to a 'new equity agenda' that takes account of inequalities based on a number of long-standing background variables such as parental education, caste and gender. But it also recognizes new forms of exclusion (based on access to particular forms of education and skills, infrastructure and communication, political marginalization and cultural stereotyping, to name a few) as major obstacles to long-term equitable development, or indeed sustained growth (Birdsall and Londono 1997; World Bank 2006, UN 2005). Yet within the present paradigm of development thinking, while there is recognition of the need to deal with equity issues, the solutions are not seen in terms of refocusing growth priorities, including investing in areas where women are concentrated, such as agriculture. Rather, these are conceptualized in terms of using some of the returns from growth for programmes of social protection and targeted support to those unable to avail of the new opportunities being created in the high-growth sectors.​[4]​ 'Gender balancing' to take care of the needs of women would be achieved through schemes and special programmes to deal with anaemia, maternal mortality, pregnant and lactating women, credit, etc. (Hirway 2006), all reinforcing women's primary role as mothers. The 'new' India, in its celebration of markets, fails to note that women face ideological and material constraints to freely participating in markets and it is these dimensions that need to be urgently addressed. 

Central to the discussion of growth is an analysis of labour force participation rates, directly seen to contribute to economic productivity, in turn to incomes and well-being. Enhanced female participation in the work-force would then be seen as contributing positively to growth. Yet, in India, female labour force participation rates have been stubbornly low, with women and low-caste groups concentrated in low-paid, informal work. It is not surprising then to find women, especially educated women aspiring to a limited number of white-collar jobs, leave the labour force rather than join it, as soon as their family circumstances allow this to happen (Das and Desai 2003). Women's low participation is also linked ideologically to the phenomenon of 'jobless growth', wherein women's access to jobs is often seen as depriving men of opportunities and a threat to their provider roles, hence contributing to the increased violence against women both within the home and at the work-place in the modern growth period. Women then prefer to trade in autonomy and control over income to improved material and social well-being, given their dependence on the family for social security in the near-absence of state provision. While investments in education and health have risen, rather than translating into employment (given the nature and conditions of work, the gender divisions of labour and growing security concerns), they contribute to growth indirectly through a host of social reproduction tasks including a focus on the care and upbringing of children. 

The urgent need for rethinking the very conceptualization and ways of measuring inequality therefore led the MDG Task Force on Gender Equality to identify three key, interrelated domains requiring urgent attention: a) the 'capabilities' domain referring to basic human abilities as measured through education, health and nutrition; b) the 'access to resources and opportunities' domain, which includes access to economic assets (land, property, infrastructure) and resources (income and employment) as well as political opportunity; and c) the 'security' domain that seeks to reduce vulnerability to violence and conflict (Birdsall, Ibrahim and Gupta 2004). Collectively, these could create an environment that would enable an expansion of choices for women, in particular rural women, by helping address crucial social, structural and ideological constraints. Women's interests can perhaps better be served through appropriate and holistic policy measures and mechanisms that create an enabling environment for their participation in the economy, polity and society.





Understanding change is never straightforward, nor is it value-free. Gender researchers have often taken a critical view of economic development, as despite improvements, a host of problems remain -- persistent wage gaps, sexual harassment, constraints on mobility, double burdens of work, limited space in politics, etc. (Elson 1991; Rustagi 2000; Hirway 2002). The effects of growth and prosperity are often contradictory for women. 

An important issue then is that of periodization and what is new or has changed in India today. As far as women are concerned, the constitution of independent India recognized them as equal citizens with similar rights as men.  A legal framework was put in place during the decade of the 1950s to ensure these rights. Yet implementation was weak and the 'Report on the Status of Women in India, 1974', revealed large gender gaps across key areas of education, health and employment. The period from 1975-85 was perhaps a watershed in giving visibility to the continuing gender inequality in society.  Yet it is the late 1980s and early 1990s that can be said to mark the start of a 'new' India for women. There was a spate of legislation in the realms of marriage and the family (Prohibition of Dowry (Amendment) Act, 1986, Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques (PNDT) Act, 1994, etc.), as well as political participation of women (the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments in 1991 guaranteed one-third representation to women in elected local government bodies), all of which sought to give women a voice across the different institutional sites from the household to the state. While implementation continues to lag behind intention, the policy directions suggested by the National Perspective Plan for Women and Shramshakti, the Report of the Commission on Self Employed Women and Women in the Informal Sector, led to affirmative action particularly in the spheres of education and entrepreneurship,​[5]​ to provide women a more level playing field as far as market opportunities were concerned. 







Table 1: Selected indicators of women's well-being









Source: UNDP's Human Development Reports (HDR) for different years. 
Note: The indicators presented in this table follow the UNDP definitions (combined GER stands for the Gross Enrolment Ratio at Primary, Secondary and Tertiary levels; IMR is the Infant Mortality Rate per 1000 live births, MMR the Maternal Mortality Rate, GDI the Gender-adjusted Human Development Index, and GEM the Gender Empowerment Measure. No information on GEM is available for India after HDR 1998).

Yet this period has also seen a social backlash against women who are educated, have access to credit, or raise their voice.  The growing violence and attacks against working women in Indian cities, rape and molestation, are a part of everyday media coverage. The backlash is visible also in the blocking of legislation reserving one-third of the seats for women in Parliament and the state legislatures for the past 14 years. While the reporting of violent incidents may be related to growing media and civil society activism, it has nevertheless led to the demand and passing of a spate of new legislation over the last decade -- to protect women from domestic violence (2005), from being deprived of their inheritance (2005) or from being the victims of foeticide (2002).​[6]​

Locating the problem areas requires a disaggregated analysis and Rustagi (2000) shows in her presentation of gender development indicators such as sex ratios, education, female literacy, female infant and child mortality, age at marriage, fertility, and work participation, across Indian districts, just how variable the picture of gendered well-being is, with some groups and regions doing worse than others. One remarkable feature of such analysis is the troubling and complex relationship between economic growth and gender inequality, since equality indicators for north Indian states, which have seen dramatic agricultural growth, are worsening (Nillesen and Harriss-White 2004), as is the gap between the rich and the poor. Yet, attributing growth as 'cause' and gender relations as 'effect' is also problematic, due to the multiple factors interacting and contributing to these changes, hence what the paper offers is a nuanced analysis of directions of change.

ACCESS TO OPPORTUNITIES: A LOOK AT WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT

Access to resources and opportunities has been considered a central element of the equity agenda. One of the big shifts since 1991 has been the reorientation of the state away from its social responsibilities, or indeed social justice, and instead prioritizing economic productivity (Rao 2005). As a consequence, women have become visible as productive workers rather than as passive welfare recipients (Vasavi and Kingfisher 2003) though largely in informal or self-employed work, which has seen rapid expansion in both urban and rural areas, while the formal sector (offering regular wages and benefits) has shrunk in size. This is in line with global trends towards flexibility in labour organization to suit the needs of just-in-time production processes (Mitter 1994), and also towards enhancing efficiency and accountability of service delivery (especially in health and education) through contractual agreements rather than secure employment. 

Despite this, one finds female labour force participation (FLFP) almost stagnant at about 30 per cent (40 per cent for rural and 20 per cent for urban females), and less than half that of male labour force participation at around 80 per cent, from 1983-4 to 2004-5, based on data from various rounds of the National Sample Survey Organisation's (NSSO) employment and unemployment surveys (Rao et al, 2008). When one examines FLFP by caste and gender, it becomes clear that while men of all castes are equally engaged in the labour force, SC and ST women have a substantially higher participation than women of other castes in both urban and rural areas across India. This is because there are far greater taboos on upper-caste women, and working for wages is seen as a mark of low status. But a further disincentive is a widening gender gap in rewards to labour, despite regulations to the contrary such as the Equal Remuneration Act 1976. This wage discrimination results from the labelling of the sectors of work in which women constitute a majority as unskilled and semi-skilled (Hirway 2002), but also their lack of time to work a full day due to increasing burdens of domestic work, now more rigidly allocated to women. While urban areas do appear to offer more opportunities, the nuclear/small family setting means a much greater burden for women handling both domestic and employment- related work, leading to many of them dropping out of the work-force.  

The new job creation taking place mainly in the self-employed sector is polarized between the high and low end of the spectrum. One finds a small minority of highly skilled professionals able to access remunerative work and a large majority of women with less than primary education​[7]​ at the lowest end, working long hours for low wages in the service sector, either in schools and hospitals or as domestic help in households (Unni and Raveendran 2007; Himanshu 2007). In the rural sector, given the stagnation in agricultural growth, men have been diversifying into construction and services, such as transport and petty trading. Women's involvement in agriculture has, however, remained stable at over 85 per cent (in comparison to 71 per cent for men). Given the lack of growth in the agricultural sector, women's concentration in this sector has had mixed effects on them, as discussed in the next section. 

Insights from field studies conducted in Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal to understand the gendered implications of growth offer some explanation into how the processes of employment creation or the lack of it impact women's lives and social position. While some non-farm opportunities have indeed become available in the local areas, employers are not keen to employ women workers. A jute businessman in West Bengal (buying jute, sorting and packing into bales and loading them for transportation) looked very puzzled when asked about the prospects of employing women: 'Look this is not a bank. It's a jute araat (wholesale depot). It is hard work. Even the Bengalis can't do it. I get labour from the Bihar border as those men can work harder' (Mitra 2007, 44).​[8]​ In Bahraich in Uttar Pradesh, a similar response was obtained from the owner of a dal (lentils) mill – men were better able to perform both labour and managerial jobs (Nair and Mehrotra 2007, 43). A brick-kiln owner here did employ women, as part of family groups, but similar to Gupta's (2003) study of brick-kilns in Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, only men were on the employment register as workers; women were included as part of 'family labour'. While all these employers seemed aware of the labour laws, they were practiced minimally. With no agricultural incomes and limited access to non-agricultural jobs or the public space, the women's relative bargaining power in the household has weakened, leading simultaneously to an intensification of patriarchy and controls on their mobility. 

Both the field studies found Muslim women​[9]​ taking up stitching or embroidery work at home, and indeed across India Muslim women dominate different categories of home-based work (Sachar 2007). But only the poorest of the Muslim women do this work: it is laborious and has to be done on time, despite all the domestic work. The contractors are often highly exploitative, too; for embroidering one sari, a worker is paid about Rs. 800-1,000 and it takes almost a month to finish, or barely Rs. 25 per day, way below the minimum wage. The same sari sells in metropolises such as Kolkata for about Rs. 4,500. As Jaheda Begum, a kantha​[10]​ worker who also sub-contracts, puts it, 'Where do we have the contacts and the resources to do what the contractor does? We know it is exploitative but something is better than nothing' (Mitra 2007, 44) While microcredit for women has grown by leaps and bounds in the country,​[11]​ it clearly does not meet the capital needs of potential entrepreneurs like Jaheda. They lack other assets, such as land, which could be used as collateral for gaining larger bank loans, but they also lack the mobility to travel to major cities and markets to expand their contacts. The assumption that women are only capable of managing small amounts of money and petty businesses also persists.

Employment then is not a particularly good indicator of women's status or empowerment in the Indian context; neither does it appear to be connected to growth or indeed to income. In a scenario of low wages and harsh working conditions, with little support for the performance of domestic work, it is no surprise that women want to exit the labour force altogether if their husbands can provide for them. The implications on gender relations, however, reflect a loss of both mobility and autonomy for women and a strengthening of male authority and control. 

Feminization of Agricultural Labour: Flexibility and Wage Gaps

References to the feminization of agriculture are frequent, yet this process needs some unpacking. While the number of women workers per se may not have increased, feminization here refers to the rise in the proportion of female agricultural workers in the female work-force, and a rise in the share of female to male agricultural workers (Duvvury 1989). Amongst women, it is the scheduled castes and tribes​[12]​ who dominate agricultural work, when available, as combine harvesters and other technological developments have reduced the availability of work in agriculture. This is confirmed by long-term village studies such as that by Ramachandran, Swaminathan and Rawal (2001) who found in their Tamil Nadu study that the days of overall work of women in hired labour households (mostly SC) amounted to 147 on average, a figure that has remained remarkably stable since 1976.  However, the agricultural component of the total has dropped from 65 per cent in 1976-7 to 37 per cent in 1998-9. This mirrors the position for India as a whole, where the total days of employment available to a woman in a rural labour household has risen from 233 days in 1983 to 265 days in 1993-4, but days in agriculture have fallen steadily. Women have moved from agriculture into two types of work.  The first is work that pays more than daily-rated agricultural work (such as plantation work, construction, brick-kilns, road construction and other public works), but is bodily more taxing.​[13]​ The second is worse-paid, piece-rate work, in this case mainly tamarind processing, or forms of sewing as mentioned earlier. 

A key issue relates to the degree of gender flexibility in labour, since wages in general and gender wage gaps in particular depend on certain tasks being reserved for one or the other gender. Karin Kapadia comments that the gender division of labour is much more strictly enforced in wage labour than own-account farming. With the exception of ploughing, women farming at home can do any male job.​[14]​ In drought years, Pallar men did allow wives to do male tasks (digging) for wages but 'despite the dire straits their families were in, unemployed Pallar men never took up "female" jobs: they preferred to depend on their wives' wages' (2002, 197-8). In the case of wage employment, where tasks are more rigidly divided by gender, this can have perverse effects for women, as for example when their tasks are labelled 'light' by comparison to male 'heavy' work to justify higher male wages. But it can also have potentially beneficial effects where it limits competition from male labourers for some work.  Where this is combined with increasingly narrow time windows for the completion of operations such as weeding or transplanting (where double or triple cropping schedules have to be accommodated), it can offer bargaining opportunities to women workers (Jackson and Rao 2008, 87). 

The gender division of work is perhaps one way of justifying gender differentials in wages. An analysis of Agricultural Wages in India (AWI) data from 1964-70 to 1990-7 for male and female agricultural labourers reveals an absolute rise in real wages across all districts under consideration (46 districts across 17 states), alongside a slowing down in the rate of growth in the 1990s in 22 districts (73 per cent of total on which data is available) for women labourers (Chavan and Bedamatta 2006, 4045). This was accompanied by a widening gap in male-female earnings through the 1990s, especially in the southern states of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. Ramachandran, Swaminathan and Rawal's study (2001, 17) confirms this finding, as while wage rates over 1977-99 rose in real terms by 66 per cent for women and 70 per cent for men, the gender wage gap increased. While women's wage was approximately 49 per cent of male agricultural wage in 1977, the ratio was 41.6 per cent in 1999. The restricted access for women in non-agricultural employment as well as the higher degrees of mechanization leading to an overall decline in labour requirements in agriculture in these states, could be contributory factors. 

Nakkeeran (2003) argues that wage gaps reflect the hierarchies between the ideological valuations of male and female work. An aura of importance around men's work is constructed and accordingly women are constantly pushed to do relatively more monotonous, arduous, unrecognized and underpaid work. He also underlines the importance of disaggregating gender differences by caste stratification. In studying the complex mediation between caste, economic status and gender within a small village in Coimbatore district of Tamil Nadu, he shows that low-caste women who enjoy a higher work participation rate and make a significant contribution to the family economy, and consequently a higher degree of autonomy and decision-making, do not necessarily enjoy higher levels of literacy, food security, health or leisure. There is clearly not much new in 'new' India for women of poor households. The upper-caste households, in which men are usually salaried employees, predominantly hire in outside labour. Women here seldom take up any paid employment, yet they may have a better quality of life in terms of leisure, food, health and command over the labour of poorer women. Production-related activities here are planned and executed by men, while women are frequently involved in supervising and extracting work from farm workers and in household work. Usually they have little say in any decision making or in monetary control, as their work is largely invisible.

Manual Scavengers
Another sector of work, largely urban, is that of manual scavenging, which involves cleaning of both private and community-run dry latrines and disposal of the waste material. Interestingly, though not surprisingly, nearly 80 per cent of the scavengers, employed by the government, local bodies, contractors or private homes, are women (Viswanathan 2006). Recognized as a degrading, even inhuman activity, over the years several laws have been enacted and millions of rupees spent to eradicate the practice; the target for achieving the national goal of complete eradication of manual scavenging is the end of the Tenth Plan (2007). The Employment of Manual Scavengers and Construction of Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act was passed in 1993. A decade later, the Union Ministry for Social Justice and Empowerment admitted the existence of 676,000 people who lift human excreta for a living, spread across 21 states and union territories. Civil society estimates are higher, at almost 8 million people (Narula 2001; Shah et al. 2006).

Despite high levels of growth and rising incomes, the state has failed to provide a safe, scientific and efficient system of human waste disposal. This is linked perhaps to the domination of the workforce in this sector by the formerly untouchable castes and women within them, reflecting both the historical subjugation and persistent marginalization of these castes in Indian society today, but the double discrimination faced by women within these groups, with the performance of 'dirty' work by them seen as normal and acceptable. While evidence is limited, men are increasingly attempting to shift occupations in the anonymity of urban environments (how successfully is not known), as women continue to perform these 'polluting' functions.​[15]​ Difficulties in accessing good quality education and training alongside discrimination in seeking other forms of employment have kept these traditions and their hereditary nature alive (Shah et al. 2006). While many of them are private cleaners, earning a pittance, even those employed by municipalities are often on casual contracts, paid once in four to six months and given no health benefits or protective gear such as masks, gloves and utensils (Narula 2001). 

Haryana, one of the most prosperous states in north-west India, for instance, claims, like several others, that it doesn't have manual scavengers. Zaidi (2006), however, in several visits to different parts of the state, found that the authorities had not only failed in their commitment to eradicate manual scavenging but also lied to the Supreme Court of India. In Panipat town, she saw at least ﬁve dry latrines and met three scavengers. Bhagwati has spent her whole life doing precisely the task the civic authorities deny the existence of – cleaning dry latrines manually. 'I have been doing this ever since I can remember. My mother did it, my sister did it and I am doing it.' The only saving grace, according to Bhagwati, is that there is no lack of water in the area. 'As it is, my hands and feet and waist get marked by the 'narak' (hell, in Hindi). At least, I can bathe after work', she says. Bala, 35, lives in what is commonly known as Balmiki basti in Panipat town and has been cleaning dry latrines in some of the houses in the area for the past 18 years. She would gladly stop doing it if she had an alternative. 'Who wants to lift other people's ﬁlth? But I am forced to because we're so poor. No household gives me more than Rs. 15-20 per month', she says.  Despite rising middle class incomes, what such women earn is a pittance, well below the minimum wage, and the only way to make ends meet is by providing this service to at least ten households.

Zaidi (2006) notes that on a visit to Nand Nagri in the National Capital Region (NCR), she met Meena, a volunteer with the Safai Karamchari Andolan (SKA), working as a manual scavenger since she was nine. Meena somehow managed to stay in school until she cleared her secondary level examinations, but education brought little change. 'This is what we've been doing for generations and nobody gives us other work', she alleged. Meena's mother cleans most of the private dry latrines in the area. She says: 'There are about 10 dry latrines now. I get Rs. 10 per house. Many houses have got pucca latrines, but the way they are constructed, the sewage comes from a pipe into the open gutter below. And we have to clean this gutter. On many days the gutter overﬂows with excreta and when there isn't enough water to wash it away, it accumulates and dries. My husband sweeps it into a corner and I lift it out of the gutter using two pieces of plastic and put it into a basket.' Zaidi argues that the scavengers are made to believe that this is their work and they cannot do anything else, so they don't want to talk about it. 

What is striking is that while the legal framework in India suggests the pursuit of a policy of equality, with cutbacks in state service provision as well as monitoring mechanisms and increased dependence on the markets, these are rendered less effective, especially when the many social practices seen as 'normal' from a cultural point of view, are taken into account. While investments in improved sewerage and waste management systems need to be prioritized, this has not happened. Women, with the exception of a small minority of professionals, even where employed, are pushed into low-paid and degrading sectors of work, often associated with cleaning dirt, yet normalized as an extension of domestic and reproductive work that involve a range of cleaning tasks. While women's reproductive work is here used as an excuse for keeping them in a sector that violates all forms of human dignity, at the other end of the growth spectrum, women's reproductive lives are simply ignored.

Information and communication technologies (ICT): Reinforcing gender stereotypes?

As mentioned at the start, services have led the growth spurt in new India. One of the most acclaimed and fastest-growing service sub-sectors relates to information and communication technologies, in particular software development and IT-enabled outsourcing. The rapid growth of this sector led to the establishment of a Ministry of Information Technology in the Government of India in 1999 and the setting up of a task force that emphasized the role of education, in particular tertiary education, for making India a knowledge superpower. It is precisely the need for technical skills of a minimum standard that has made IT a symbol of urban, upper class/caste, male and anglicized control, raising questions about whether technology can really lead to a socially just life. While there are instances of the use of ICTs for rural development and the empowerment of the poor, these remain exceptions rather than the rule, with rural areas in general lacking the infrastructure, the financial resources or the necessary literacy, language and computer skills required for engaging with the IT economy (Mitter 2003). 
  
Women constitute only about 21 per cent of software professionals in software companies, with a lower share amongst system analysts and programmers (Basant and Rani 2004). Although IT is a new field, a gendered division of labour is already visible, with women concentrated in end-user, lower-skilled jobs as in call centres and telemarketing, or related to word processing and data entry, and comprising only a small percentage of managerial, maintenance and design personnel in networks, operating systems or software development (Mitter 2003). While wages are relatively high in this sector compared to other options available to women (Rs. 5,000-15,000 compared to a minimum wage of approximately Rs. 2,500-3,000 per month), the work is repetitive, closely monitored, insecure (with ease of dismissal), and involves long hours, often during the night. This last feature has led the government to ratify the Protocol to amend the ILO Convention 89 that prevented night work for women in 2004, and thereafter to amend the Factories Act, 1948, in 2005, to allow women to work at night, putting the onus for safety on the employer. While this does open up opportunities for women and supports the ideal of equal opportunities, the concerns about physical safety do raise questions about family status and reputation. Interviews by Patel (2005) revealed contradictory voices of women employees, reflecting tensions between work and self-fulfilment. It is thus not surprising to find a largely male work-force in this industry, and amongst women, those who are young, unmarried and have few domestic or childcare responsibilities. While there appears to be no discrimination against women at the entry level, very few attain managerial positions, perhaps because they drop out to get married, or fail to equally participate in social evenings and networking that help in promotions. They see this as temporary work, rather than a long-term career option.

ICTs have great potential in terms of supporting women as entrepreneurs and online service providers as distance and mobility is made less relevant for commercial and business transactions.  It enables women to combine both productive and domestic roles.  However, making this happen requires comprehensive policy support in terms of education, training, affordability and access to credit, access to information and support networks etc.  Women's active and meaningful participation at all levels of decision-making are likely to create a favourable policy environment. Without appropriate policy measures, as Mitter (2003) notes, the patterns prevalent in the so-called old economy will also appear in the digital or ICT-assisted, new economy.
 
THE DOMAIN OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES

As seen from the above discussion, low levels of education, alongside other social and cultural barriers, keep a majority of rural women, especially of the low castes, confined to the low-growth agricultural sector or caste-specific work such as scavenging.  Even those with higher education often lack the technical skills and confidence to participate equally in the high-growth ICT sector. 

Female education has been widely seen as an essential element of human capabilities, a key element of female empowerment (Nussbaum 2000) and a major driver of growth. Schulz (2002) suggests that this may work through an improvement in women's work participation.  Employed women may focus on education and health of their children, who would constitute the future work-force.  This attention to their development, alongside a decline in fertility levels, may lead to improved care and quality of the existing children. Ramaswamy (2007), in his analysis of interstate variations in educational attainments, finds that in the five bottom states in terms of growth, only 12 per cent of females had a secondary or higher secondary education against a national average of 16 per cent, with higher income states at a clear advantage. He finds a positive relationship between states with higher female GER (gross enrolment ratio) for secondary education and labour productivity growth (see also Kingdon and Unni 1997). 

Literacy has been rising consistently since the early 1990s, for both men and women across urban and rural areas, the primary reason being the enhanced access to basic education at the village level (including the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, or Education for All Campaign, since 2001) (Das 2007). Other policy measures, in particular the introduction of the midday meals in all primary schools (Dreze and Goyal 2003), have supported this trend. Urban women continue to have better educational outcomes than their rural counterparts, yet almost a quarter of urban women remain illiterate in 2004-5 (as against 50 per cent of all rural women). Their literacy rates are only four percentage points better than that of rural males (nearly 29 per cent are illiterate) (Rao et al. 2008).

In terms of growth effects, Bhandari and Bordoloi (2006) found that compared to illiterates, those who have completed primary schooling have 31 per cent greater incomes, those who have completed middle school 45 per cent, those who have completed secondary schooling 89 per cent, graduates 136 per cent and professionals 171 per cent greater incomes. What this suggests is that secondary education may be a threshold level for education to influence earnings. Most rural girls, however, end up dropping out of middle school for a range of reasons: educating girls beyond a point is considered futile (given the imperatives of marriage); middle-school-age girls are needed at home to help mothers with house work and also take care of the younger siblings; and middle schools do not exist in all villages, so attending middle school would mean travelling some distance, which is both costly and unsafe for girls who have just attained puberty, to mention a few (see also Govinda and Bandyopadhyaya 2007). 

The field studies echoed some of these reasons.  An ST woman in West Bengal, noted, 'there is no use educating girls beyond the primary level because ultimately they have no option but to work in the fields' (Mitra 2007, 25). Bhandari and Bordoloi (2006) confirm that with similar household and educational characteristics, SC/STs are likely to earn 10 per cent less than other households and women a third less than men. Given the low returns to female labour, as discussed in the last section, female education is more likely to contribute to growth through women's social reproduction activities rather than direct engagement with production. For the upper castes, a sacred duty of parents is to get their daughters married and if a 'good groom' is found, the girl-child is taken out of school and married off. It is also a fact that the higher a woman is educated, the more her parents have to pay for her dowry. As discussed in the next section, the practice of dowry has increased even more rapidly in the new India, and spread to all sections of the population. Of course, exceptions do exist, and there are instances of girls who have resisted this pressure. 

In the Bahraich villages in Uttar Pradesh, financial constraints were highlighted as a major reason for not sending children to school. The families were large, so out of six children, two or three may be educated. Here, very few SC or poor ‘other backward classes’ (OBC) children proceeded beyond the primary level. For Muslim girls, it was not even this, just a few years in the local madrasa (Nair and Mehrotra 2007, 45). Alongside the issue of cost, there is one of quality too, with parents linking their children's education with better employment prospects. Yet with a poorly functioning public education system, without investments in private schooling or additional coaching, employment prospects remain bleak. Girls tend to lose out, for as the Probe Report notes, 'parents are not generally opposed to female education, but they are reluctant to pay for it' (1999, 97). With increasing privatization of education, growing gaps are already visible – those with resources are likely to benefit and those without (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and girls), go to poorly-run and ill-equipped government schools, getting even further marginalized (Mehrotra and Panchamukhi 2006).

The Annual Status of Education Review (ASER 2007) found that it was not parental demands that kept children out of school but rather those related to inadequate infrastructure, insensitive teachers and uninteresting curricula. As Ramachandran (2004, 86) notes, 'hierarchies of access' are discernible at all levels of the education system. The presence of an easily accessible and good quality government school, which functions regularly, can help overcome many problems, especially for the deprived sub-groups of SCs and STs and girls amongst them. While there is a continued need for state intervention and affirmative action in education, this education needs to be of high quality to ensure learning (see also Mehta 2006 on this point), to eliminate existing sources of disadvantage.

This will, however, require enhanced investments rather than low-cost options, which include incentives, making the curricula both relevant and interesting, introducing flexible school timings with crèche facilities, but most important, addressing the issue of recruitment and training of teachers (Tilak 2007). Chakrabarti and Joglekar (2006), analysing the patterns and changes in the allocation of government funds for education before and after the introduction of new economic policies in 15 major Indian states, find that while growth in state real per capita income is seen to enhance educational expenditures, most states have witnessed a decline in the post-reform era. While this increased from 5.65 per cent in the 1970s to 6.37 per cent in the 1980s, there was a decline to 4.48 per cent in the 1990s (ibid, 1466). They note, 'States with a higher proportion of Scheduled Caste population was found to have a significantly lower expenditure on education at aggregate, elementary and higher level. This is particularly discouraging in view of the fact that these social groups already lag behind others in terms of their educational status' and need enhanced investments in order to catch up with other groups (ibid, 1471). Similar results were also obtained for the Scheduled Tribes. They also found that where state investments were low, girl's education lagged behind, clearly highlighting the need for government to put a sustained effort into designing policies and allocating resources targeted towards girls and women. 





The links between growth and gender-based violence are not clear, yet media reports of rapes, killings and attacks on working women, and women in turn asserting their rights, are increasingly frequent. The National Family Health Surveys have been attempting to collect information on violence against women since the mid-1990s, following global attention to this issue, including the passing of the UN Convention on Violence against Women in 1993. Table 2 shows self-reported figures for percentages of ever-married women beaten or physically mistreated since age 15 by caste for the years 1998-9 and 2005-6. The data indicate that the incidence of violence of all types, with the exception of mistreatment by in-laws, appears to have increased across all categories of women. Higher figures of violence persist for lower-caste women, despite being perhaps the most economically active. This often raises the question of whether the incidence of physical violence is actually lower among upper castes or whether the SC women are more candid about their condition compared to the more convention-bound and status-conscious higher castes, unable to break out of the burdens of maintaining status and family honour in the new India. For the educated, upper castes, in fact, dowry inflation has contributed to growing violence and subordination of women.




Table 2 Women's experience with beatings and physical mistreatment, 







1:  per cent ever physically mistreated by husband
2.  per cent ever physically mistreated by in-laws
3.  per cent ever physically mistreated by other family members/persons
4.  per cent ever faced any violence
Source: NFHS Reports
On 23 June 2005, the cabinet approved the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Bill, 2005.  As noted by Kothari (2005), this amendment provided immediate emergency remedies for women facing violence such as protection orders, non-molestation orders, the right to reside in the shared household, etc. This followed the experience of women's organizations working with battered and harassed women that increasingly showed that it was the fear of being thrown out of the matrimonial home or any shared household that often compelled these women to put up with violence. As Rajalakshmi (2005) points out, the Act covers all those women who were or had been in a relationship with the abuser, where both parties lived together in a shared household and were related by consanguinity, marriage or adoption. Domestic violence then includes not only inter-spousal violence, but also violence perpetrated by other family members. This is significant because generally, an important part of the power relationship between spouses and their families relates to dowry and its ramifications (Karlekar 1995). 
Dowry is generally understood as the transfer of wealth from the bride's family to the groom's at the time of her marriage. It could be a gift of jewelry or other goods, an investment to help the young couple set up their home,​[16]​ a pre-mortem inheritance or a symbolic expense to celebrate the daughter's marriage (Rao 2006). Yet dowry has ceased to be voluntary and the economic boom has in fact been accompanied by inflation in dowry demands and a consequent increase in dowry-related violence (Rao 1993), despite the existence of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961. Anderson (2003) points to the possible relationship between dowry inflation and growing wealth disparities within castes, which creates pressure on parents to marry their daughter to a man of the same or higher caste, lest their own status be threatened. The preference for hypergamy, as a path for the more prosperous lower castes to improve their social status,​[17]​ in a context of where rigid caste restrictions are eroding, has enhanced the competition for upper-caste grooms, pushing up dowry payments, often as a means of maintaining caste boundaries. The practice of dowry, widespread amongst all groups and regions in India today, is associated with other gender discriminatory practices such as female infanticide, and amongst married women, rigid seclusion and bride burning if the promised dowries are not forthcoming (Banerjee 2002). The National Crime Bureau of the Government of India reports approximately 6,000 dowry deaths per year, but this is probably an underestimate (Anderson 2003) if one considers the statistics on burn mortalities. As Batra (2003) shows, India is the only country where fire burns was a leading cause of death, 80 per cent of them women, a majority married.
The demand for the criminalization of dowry death and domestic violence had in fact much earlier culminated successfully in the enactment of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code in 1983, Section 304B in 1986, with corresponding provisions in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. These criminal law reforms held great promise at the time of their enactment and sought for the first time to bring the issue of domestic or family violence (including that related to dowry) out of the protected private realm of the family and into the public domain. Yet societal responses to domestic violence still largely exclude legal intervention. Agnes (1998) notes how the general perception of women who muster up the courage to approach a police station is that of a deviant. Instead of registering her complaint the police would counsel her about her role in the house, actively discourage arrest and focus instead on responses such as calling the abuser to the police station for 'conciliation'. Sentences tend to be less serious for those convicted of domestic violence, they are rarely arrested, prosecuted, or sentenced as severely as other violent offenders (Kothari 2005), perhaps explaining in part the increase in violence against women across all categories reported in the third National Family Health Survey, 2005-6 (Table 2). It is only when the abuse becomes intolerable that most women appear to be willing to speak out. 
In a study in Gujarat, Visaria (2000) found that contrary to prevalent belief, educated women were beaten as much by their husbands as those who were illiterate or less educated. Property, especially the ownership of a house, however, appears to reduce the risk of violence substantially (Panda and Agarwal, 2005). According to research by the International Centre for Research of Women in two states of India – West Bengal and Kerala -- non-propertied women are much more likely to experience violence than propertied women (especially those with a house), both physical (38.5 against 15 per cent) and psychological (50 against 28 per cent) (ICRW 2006, 79). 
Growing reportage of sexual harassment at the workplace in the last five years​[18]​ led the Ministry of Women and Child Development to draft a bill on this issue, which was circulated for public comments in 2007. This followed the Supreme Court's orders and guidelines in the Vishakha vs State of Rajasthan case [1997(7) SCC:323)], which sought to set in place mechanisms for the resolution and prevention of sexual harassment, enjoining employers to provide safe working environments to women workers. Interestingly, these guidelines apply to both the organized and unorganized sectors and to all women working part-time, on contract or in a voluntary capacity. The bill has, however, not yet been passed by the Parliament nor are the guidelines implemented seriously. Unless existing legislation is implemented, widespread social attitudes and cultural perceptions that relate to blaming the 'victim' in the case of both sexual harassment and domestic violence will be difficult to transform.

One of the startling and disturbing aspects of gendered well-being in India, which does not show clear signs of improvement, is the adverse to women sex ratios resulting from excess mortality of girls (Mazumdar and Krishnaji 2001). If economic development by whatever means, including liberalized economic policy, is not associated with an improvement in sex ratios then there is a serious disjunction between such policy and gender justice. The 2001 census results show that between 1991 and 2001 the sex ratio has improved across the population as a whole, but the important indicator of juvenile sex ratio dropped from 947 to 927, and to very low levels in the richer states – 820 in Haryana and 792 in Punjab. The association of low sex ratios with prosperity has been clear for some time. Banerjee and Jain (2001, 94) quote the 1931 Census to evidence the inverse relationship between sex ratios and social standing, with the sex ratios for advanced castes being 878, intermediate castes 935 and depressed castes 982. While this pattern still holds, there are indeed worrying new signs of excess girl mortality amongst groups such as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, which have not in the past been characterized by the complex of son preference and dowry that seems to drive female infanticide, foeticide and neglect of girls (Agnihotri 2000). ​[19]​ 





What I have tried to show in this paper is that despite a period of rapid economic growth in India today, the expanded opportunities and benefits have not been equally accessible to all groups of people; rural and low-caste women in particular appear to have been largely bypassed. What the analysis also brings to the fore is the importance of disaggregation to understand and come to grips with processes of inequality more broadly and gender inequality more specifically. Despite improvements in overall well-being, areas of high growth and economic prosperity appear precisely to be hotspots in terms of excess female mortality, violence against women and their increased subordination.

Labour force participation and education have been seen as two key pathways linking gender equality and growth. The lack of a definite relationship between them raises the need to better understand the gendered implications of the growth process – the nature of jobs available to women, the conditions of work, as well as the need to balance productive and reproductive responsibilities. While non-agricultural employment and incomes have been growing in India over the past 20 years, over 95 per cent of women workers are engaged in agricultural labour or informal employment characterized by low wages, absence of secure contracts, worker benefits or any form of social protection. High productivity, as in the ICT sector, often demands long as well as irregular hours of work, sitting uneasily with women's personal lives as well as considerations of status and appropriateness. Shifting patterns and structures of employment, based on notions of flexible specialization and need-based contracts, have thus only aggravated the problem of invisibility and informality, further reinforced by social norms and attitudes relating to the gender divisions of work, especially the notion of 'family labour' and the differential valuations of productive and reproductive work. Despite the prevalence of a plethora of acts and policies to ensure minimum remuneration, equal benefits, as well as safety, these are not implemented, not even in government programmes and organizations.

Except for a small minority of professionals, a majority of women, concentrated in sectors that are low-paid and involve harsh working conditions, are then confronted with major trade-offs in terms of participation in growth and the potential benefits from this and investment in the maintenance and social reproduction of their households. Rather than seen as contributing to growth, women's paid work is seen as contributing to a loss of household status and a threat to male provider roles, the aspiration for both men and women therefore is to withdraw women from the labour force as soon as they are able to do so economically. Women also tend to prioritize investments in marriage and the family rather than independent careers, as this seems to offer greater security and support than the state (through welfare provisioning) or markets (through secure job opportunities), despite loss of autonomy.   

Education perhaps has been more significant in explaining growth differences than work participation. Despite a massive expansion in educational investments over the present decade, this seems mainly to ensure primary educational access to all children, and continues to be of poor quality. The decision to educate girls is driven by the marriage market and sustains enrolments to the level considered sufficient for a good match, though too low to make an impact on employability, especially in professional sectors. While detailed studies of intra-household control over income and expenditure are not available for the last decade, since it is likely that women's relative contributions to household incomes are declining,​[20]​ this is possibly leading to a deprioritization of their needs as seen in patterns of consumption. Chowdhry (1999) points to investments in living room furniture and other status symbols such as TVs and fans, rather than drudgery-reducing equipment such as grinders or gas stoves, in the case of Haryana. This devaluation also intensifies the new segregation in fee-paying services, especially education and health, and enhances acts of violence against women (including female foeticide).

What emerges quite clearly then is that the fast pace of growth in 'new India' alone cannot deliver equality outcomes. While gender and caste gaps have been improving over the last decade, the improvement is but marginal in the last five years, which coincides with exceptionally high rates of growth in both rural and urban areas. Improving education and rising household incomes can also have potentially perverse effects on women's labour force participation and other indicators of women's status such as the flexibility in gender divisions of work or the ability to exercise agency in negotiating everyday power relations. The words of a graduate Jat woman in western Uttar Pradesh, confined to her home, sums up these contradictions: 
My first-born is a daughter, and when during my second pregnancy, my husband insisted that we check the sex of the foetus and then abort it, I was upset beyond measure, yet I had no choice but to comply. My husband provides for us, I don't move out of the house, even in the village, not even to the children's school, or to buy clothes for myself, he does it all (Interview by author, 10/2/2009). 

While material comforts are not lacking, there is an intensification of male authority and control, and a silently deepening discrimination against women.














^1	  This paper draws on two pieces of collaborative work I have been involved in, namely, a review on the Gendered Implications of Liberalisation in India, conducted for UNRISD, 2004 and a Gender, Caste and Growth Assessment of India, 2008, along with two state studies in West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh, conducted for the Department of International Development, UK. While the argument in this paper remains my own, I would like to acknowledge the contribution of my collaborators, Cecile Jackson, Arjan Verschoor, Ashwini Deshpande, Amaresh Dubey, Amit Mitra, Latha Nair and Nishi Mehrotra for their insights. 
^2	  Headcount poverty ratio refers to the per cent of population living below the national poverty line. There is however an ongoing debate on poverty measurement and poverty lines in India.
^3	  National Sample Survey data reveal a declining participation of men in domestic work across all caste categories in rural and urban areas. The percentage of men engaged in domestic work has decreased from 0.47 to 0.35 and of women increased from 44.26 to 45.61 over the 1983-4 to 2004-5 period in urban areas, with some variation across groups (Rao et al. 2008), indicating a rigidification of the gender division of roles within households. Apart from the ideological separation of productive and reproductive roles, this could also reflect a lack of suitable job opportunities for women, leading to increased dependence on men and their families.  
^4	  The 2008 World Development Report entitled 'Agriculture for Development' blames the neglect and underinvestment in agriculture and the rural sectors over the past twenty years for the persistence of poverty in much of the developing world as well as growing political tensions in 'transforming' countries such as India, yet solutions are more in the nature of enhanced aid and social protection.
^5	  Special programmes for women were set up at the central level such as Mahila Samakhya for the provision of education and Rashtriya Mahila Kosh to ensure credit access.
^6	  Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act was passed in 2005; the Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act was passed in 1994, and amended in 2002; the Hindu Succession Act was amended in 2005 to extend coparcenary rights to women; the Protection of Women against Sexual Harassment at the Workplace Bill was introduced in 2007, but has not yet been made an Act.
^7	  More than 40 per cent of women have no education and less than 6 per cent have tertiary education (Mohanty 2006).
^8	  The ability to work hard and not shirk work are often arguments offered in favour of employing migrant workers, who are paid lower wages and are easier to control.
^9	  Muslims constitute 12 per cent of the Indian population, yet have worse education, health and income indicators compared to the total population, with the exception of SCs and STs. Muslim women are further subject to seclusion practices, which constrain their mobility and autonomy (Sachar 2007).
^10	  A lot of small stitches used for creating patterns and designs on a range of textiles and quilts.
^11	  The SHG-linkage programme has grown from support to 500 SHGs in 1992 to 2.9 million in 2006-07, covering over 40 million poor households, 90 per cent of the actual SHG members being women. (http://www.nabard.org/fileupload/DataBank/AnnualReports/ContentEnglish/Development%20Initiatives.pdf, Annual Report 2006-7, accessed on 6/12/07).
^12	  For the SCs, much of this is likely to be agricultural wage work as they are either landless or marginal land-holders. The STs do own land and a large number of them are cultivators, yet due to poor quality of land, their own poverty and lack of public investment, they additionally join the agricultural labour force. Upper-caste women continue to report agricultural work, but this is more likely to involve supportive activities and post-harvest work, rather than working directly on the fields.
^13	  Quite a lot of the better-paid work is for activities that make great physical demands on women's bodies, and the character of these jobs therefore may make women who are nutritionally challenged unwilling to engage in them (Jackson and Palmer-Jones 1999).
^14	  On being asked about the taboo on ploughing for women, Santal women in Rao's study (2008, 194) were quite relieved that at least there was one task that men had to perform and this was seen as a blessing rather than a form of subordination.
^15	  The idea of pollution is linked to that of ritual purity, so particular tasks that were seen to be 'unclean' such as handling blood during birth or death, skinning the leather off dead animals and dealing with leather processing and products, washing dirty clothes, washing utensils, cleaning the house and toilets, removing waste, etc. were seen as polluting, and historically accorded to the lower castes.
^16	  Heyer (1992) and Chari (2004) in their studies in South India found dowries to be a means of social networking and forming business alliances between rural elites as well as a source of capital to get young men started in business respectively.
^17	  The process of claiming social status by adopting the practices of the upper castes and classes has been termed by M.N Srinivas (1962) as Sanskritisation.
^18	  Cases from the IT industry, in relation to harassment during night shifts, spurred this issue.
^19	  As per the Census of India 2001, Haryana and Punjab had the lowest sex ratios at 861 and 874 respectively, while Kerala and Tamil Nadu stood at 1058 and 986 respectively. The All India sex ratio for SCs in 2001 is down to 936, only marginally better than that for the total population at 933. 
^20	  Amartya Sen's (1990) model of cooperative conflicts to understand gender relations at the household level suggests that well-being outcomes are dependent on both perceptions of and actual contributions to the household.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